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Abstract 
 
In a distribution channel, where multiple 
manufacturers and retailers compete intensively, 
manufacturers’ investment decisions on directly 
communicating with end consumers are strategic. In this 
study, we examined the interactive relationship between 
the manufacturers’ management response strategies to 
online customer reviews and the channel structure 
formed in the online market. We collected data from 
Amazon.com, where the manufacturers, instead of the 
retailers, decide whether and how to respond to the 
customer reviews. The study illustrates the interaction 
of channel structure and manufacturers’ management 
response strategies to the reviews. On the one hand, if a 
manufacturer invests in responding to customer reviews, 
more retailers are willing to carry its product. On the 
other hand, if more retailers sell a manufacturer’s 
product, or if there are more intensive intra-competition 
in the retailer channels, the manufacturer is more likely 
to invest in management response. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As marketing becomes more and more customer-
oriented, manufacturers’ marketing strategy extends to 
direct communications with end consumers. For 
example, High Ridge Brands, one leading consumer 
packaged goods company, is communicating directly 
with millions of customers through email, social, mobile, 
earned and owned digital channels. This helps the 
company to build up a business valued at $415 million 
in five years 1 . Directly communicating with end 
consumers helps manufacturers understand consumers’ 
needs and preferences. Consequently, manufacturers 
                                                 
1https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinsights/2016/06/07/how-
leading-brands-are-winning-the-direct-to-customer-
conversation/#48bc75a54fbd 
can keep a high retention rate, acquire new customers 
and eventually increase profitability. Moreover, those 
manufacturers who maintain strong relationships with 
end customers appeal to retailers.  
In a distribution channel, where intense competition 
exists among multiple manufacturers and retailers, 
manufacturers’ investment decisions on direct 
communications with end consumers are complicated, 
as they interact with the channel structure of the 
distribution channel. On the one hand, the return of a 
manufacturer’s investment on direct communicating 
with end consumers depends on the structure of the 
distribution channel. Intuitively, communicating with 
end consumers can increase the brand value of its 
products, consequently the sales from each retailer 
channel. The more retailer channels a manufacturer is 
using, the more benefit it can gain by the direct 
communication strategy. However, the competition 
among the retailers may weaken the total benefit to 
some extent. In addition, manufacturers’ direct 
communication strategies may cause retailers’ free-
riding behaviors to reduce their marketing investments. 
As a consequence, the total sales of the distribution 
channel do not increase as expected and the 
manufacturer receives less benefit from its’ direct 
communication strategy. On the other hand, the 
manufacturer’s direct communication strategy affects 
the retailers’ adoption decisions and consequently 
reshape the structure of the distribution channel. 
Directly communicating with consumers augments 
consumer satisfaction and brand recognition of the 
manufacturer’s products and induces more retailers to 
deliver the products.  Furthermore, the strategy 
represents a commitment by the manufacturer to 
reinforce the role of the retailer channels [32], which 
consolidates existing retailers’ collaboration willingness.  
Nevertheless, increased brand equity may give 
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manufacturers more power than retailers [3,32], which 
distance the retailer from consumers [8]. It may hurt 
retailers’ interests and impede the retailers’ adoption 
decision. Besides, as directly communicating with end 
consumers requires substantial human and financial 
resources, manufacturers need to consider the cost as 
well when making their investment decisions.  In 
summary, there is lack of theoretical understanding of 
how manufacturers optimize their direct communication 
strategy under different channel structures, and how 
their direct communication strategies restructure the 
distribution channel. 
We use a unique context, Amazon.com, to explore 
the relationship between manufacturers’ investment in 
communicating with end consumers and channel 
structure. In the online marketplace, retailers list 
products by different manufacturers in their channels 
and independently set retail prices. End consumers share 
their purchasing experiences through customer reviews, 
which are sorted according to the products but not to the 
retailers who sold the products. It’s the manufacturers, 
instead of the retailers, to manage whether and how to 
respond to customer reviews. In this market, 
management response to customer reviews becomes a 
critical tactic of directly communicating with end 
consumers.  
Our study aims to examine the interaction between 
the manufacturers’ management response investment 
decision and the channel structure formed in the 
marketplace. Specifically, we consider two research 
questions: (1) How are manufacturers’ management 
response strategies affected by the features of the 
channel structure? (2) How do manufacturers' 
management response strategies restructure the 
distribution channel?  To address these questions, we 
build a theoretical model and empirically examine the 
relationship between channel structure and 
manufacturers’ management response investment 
decision using a simultaneous equation model. The 
empirical results illustrate that the evolution of channel 
structure is altered by the customer reviews and 
manufacturers’ responding strategies to the reviews. 
Specifically, positive customer reviews of a product 
allure retailers to sell the product. If the manufacturer 
invests in responding to customer reviews, more 
retailers are willing to carry its product.  Our study also 
shows the impact of channel structure on the 
manufacturer’s management response strategy. If more 
retailers sell a manufacturer’s product, or if there are 
more intensive intra-competition in the retailer channels, 
the manufacturer is more likely to invest in responding 
to customer reviews.  
This research fills a substantial gap in the literature 
on channel structure and manufacturer’s marketing 
strategy of directly communicating with end consumers 
by examining the relationship between channel structure 
and manufacturers’ management response to customer 
reviews. Moreover, it provides practical suggestions for 
manufacturers to invest in marketing communication 
strategy direct to end consumers under different channel 
structures. 
 
2. Literature review  
 
2.1. The relationship between manufacturer’ 
marketing strategies and channel relationship 
 
Some studies focus on manufacturers’ brand related 
marketing strategies to end consumers in a distribution 
channel. Davis & Mentzer (2008) suggested that 
retailers depend on manufacturers’ brand equity to 
access to consumers [8]. Webster (2000) thought that 
manufacturers’ brand is a key element in channel 
relationship as the brand can increase retailers’ profit, 
gives the retailers credibility and protect retailers from 
competition from other resellers [32]. Zhang et al. (2017) 
showed that marketing strategies to improve consumers’ 
brand loyalty are channel management strategies as with 
the increase of consumers’ brand loyalty, retailers’ 
dependence on suppliers increases [39]. In the industrial 
multi dyadic channel, Dahlquis & Griffith (2014) found 
that industrial component suppliers (CS) will make 
marketing investment direct to indirect industrial buyers 
(IIB) to communicate its product-specific value to IIB 
and attract original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to 
use the CS’s product [7].  
A few studies have found that the effect of 
manufacturers’ marketing strategies depends on the 
characteristics of the channel structure. Neslin et al. 
(1995) suggested that the benefit of manufacturers’ 
advertising directly to end consumers depends on the 
reaction of both retailers and consumers [21]. Pauwels 
(2007) showed that the effectiveness of manufacturer 
promotions for consumer goods is affected by 
competitors’ wholesale price reduction and retailers 
pass-through of promotion behaviour [23]. Zhang & Xie 
(2012) discovered that when there are multiple 
symmetric retailers in the distribution channel, 
manufacturers’ national advertising helps to generate 
sales of retailers that carry products of its brands, and as 
the retailer’s number scales up, it contributes 
increasingly to add profits to both the manufacturer and 
the retailers in equilibrium [40]. Chutani & Sethi (2018) 
have considered both national advertising effort and co-
operation advertising effort decision of manufacturer 
and found that as the number of retailers in the 
distribution channel increase, local advertising effort by 
each retailer decreases and national advertising effort by 
each manufacturer increases [6]. 
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Overall, the existing research has studied the 
relationship between manufacturers’ marketing 
strategies and channel relationship. However, the 
research about the relationship between manufacturers’ 
marketing strategies of directly communicating with 
end consumers and channel structure is limited.  And the 
study about management response and its relationship 
with channel structure is rare. Next, we discuss some 
studies related to management response to online 
customer reviews. 
 
2.2. Management response to online customer 
reviews 
 
Many studies have examined the effect of online 
customer review (including rating and text) on product 
sales [4,5,10,29,30,38,41] and consumer satisfaction 
[9,20]. Specifically, product and consumer 
characteristics are used as moderators in studying the 
effect of online review [2,11,13]. Moreover, some 
studies have examined the effect of online reviews on 
channel competition [15]. Existing studies have 
recognized the effect of online customer review, and the 
management response to online reviews have become an 
interest of academics. Most of the studies in this area 
focus on the impact of management response on firms’ 
performance and consumers’ satisfaction. 
Some research focuses on studying the impact of 
management response on firms’ performance, including 
firms’ financial performance and firms’ reputation. Ye 
et al. (2008) found that management response to online 
customer reviews is likely to influence consumers’ 
perceived value of the brand and their purchase attention, 
and consequently increase product sales in the hotel 
industry [37]. Specifically, some important 
characteristics of management response, including the 
total number of management responses, the length and 
response time, have a positive relationship with hotel 
financial performance [35,36]. Besides, management 
responses can mitigate the effect of negative reviews on 
brand or firm evaluations [25,31] and improve firms’ 
online reputation by increasing hotel ratings [24].   
Some other studies focus on the effect of 
management response on consumers’ satisfaction and 
attitude. Management response is part of firms’ 
customer relationship management strategies, leading to 
more positive consumer attitudes towards the 
organization [16,28,33]. Responding to the online 
complaints has a positive effect on the company, 
including existing consumers’ satisfaction and their 
continued loyalty to the company [12,17]. Specifically, 
Min et al. (2015) have found that management response 
includes empathy or paraphrasing statements for 
negative online reviews can even increase the 
satisfaction of potential customers [19].  
In this paper, we focus on studying the relationship 
between management response strategy and channel 
structure by modelling the effect of the channel structure 
characteristics on management response decision and 
the effect of management response decision on retailers’ 
adoption decision simultaneously. Studying this 
relationship will provide further insight into the effect 
of channel structure on manufacturers’ direct marketing 
strategies to end consumers. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
 
Given that we are modelling manufacturer’s 
management response investment decision considering 
the structure of the distribution channel, we develop a 
theoretical framework to describe the relationship 
between manufacturers and their retailers in which 
manufacturers’ management response decisions and the 
number of their retailers are determined endogenously. 
We consider a marketplace in which a few 
manufacturers sell their products through multiple 
independent retailers. The manufacturers, instead of the 
retailers, decide whether to respond to end consumers’ 
product reviews to maximize their profits considering 
the characteristics of the channel structure.  The retailers 
decide whether to adopt the manufacturers’ products 
considering the former’s management response 
strategies. The manufacturers’ management response 
investment decisions interact with the number of their 
retailers dynamically and eventually reach an 
equilibrium state. The model is based on following 
general assumptions: (1) the manufacturers’ marginal 
costs fixed; (2) all retailers pay the same wholesale price 
for a manufacturer’s product. 
We assume that there are N retailers and M 
manufacturers in the market. For the sake of simplicity, 
we assume each manufacturer sells one product in the 
market. Manufacturers make their management 
response decision depend on the channel structure. The 
wholesale price of manufacturer j’s product is 𝑊𝑗, the 
marginal cost of manufacturer j’s product is 𝐶𝑗.  
Retailers decide whether to carry manufacturers’ 
product. The decision function is as follows: if the 
retailer i carries manufacturer j’s product, 𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1 ; 
𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 0, otherwise. 
Then the number of retailers who adopt 
manufacturer j’s product is: 
𝑛𝑗 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                              (1) 
And the number of products that the retailer i carries 
is:  
Page 4745
  
           𝑚𝑖 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1
                                                (2) 
Retailer i independently sets product j’s retail price 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 , and the sales of manufacturer j’s product is 𝑞𝑖𝑗 . 
Retailer i’s profit is as follows: 
Π𝑖
𝑟 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑊𝑗)𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑀
𝑗=1
                       (3) 
Manufacturer j’s management response strategy is 
𝑅𝑗. we assume the cost of management response strategy 
is 𝜂𝑗𝑅𝑗 , the 𝜂𝑗  depends on the characteristics of a 
manufacturer. Then, manufacturer j’s profit is as follows: 
𝛱𝑗
𝑚 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗(𝑊𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗)𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 𝜂𝑗𝑅𝑗           (4) 
We model the impact of channel structure on 
manufacturers’ management response strategy as 
follows: 
Manufacturer j optimizes 𝑅𝑗
∗ to maximize Π𝑗
𝑚
  Given 
the first order condition  𝜕Π𝑗
𝑚 𝜕 𝑅𝑗 = 0⁄ , we have 
𝑛𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗
̃ 𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗
=
𝜂𝑗
𝑊𝑗 − 𝐶𝑗
                                 (5) 
  where, 𝑣𝑗  is consumer perceived value of 
manufacturer j’s product; 
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗
̃
 denotes how consumer 
perceived value averagely affects the sales in each 
retailer channel; and  
𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗
is the marginal impact of 
management response strategy on consumer perceived 
value.  Equation (5) defines how the number of 
manufacturer j’s retailers (𝑛𝑗 ) affects its management 
response strategy (𝑅𝑗
∗).  
We then model the impact of manufacturers’ 
management response strategies on the number of 
retailers.  Retailer i decides to adopt the manufacturer 
j’s product (𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 1), if and only if its total profit when 
adopting the product is larger than that without adopting 
the product.  When the retailer decides to sell the 
product by the manufacturer j, its profits from the other 
products decrease due to the substitute effect,  ∆𝛱𝑖𝑗′ <
0  for 𝑗 ≠ 𝑗′ .  Hence, the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the retailer i to carry the manufacturer j’s 
product is  
(𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑊𝑗)𝑞𝑖𝑗 − ∆Π𝑖𝑗′ ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗′
𝑀
𝑗≠𝑗′
> 0          (6) 
We define the ∆Π𝑖𝑗′̃ as the average of ∆Π𝑖𝑗′ , where 
𝑗 ≠ 𝑗′.   Then, (6) can be approximated as  
         (𝑃𝑖𝑗 − 𝑊𝑗)𝑞𝑖𝑗 > 𝑚𝑖 ⋅ ∆Π𝑖𝑗′̃                           (7) 
 
 
4. Hypothesis development 
 
Based on the above theoretical model, we develop 
nine hypotheses as shown in Figure 1.  Due to the space 
limit, we briefly explain the reasoning for the first three 
hypotheses. 
Figure 1 Hypotheses 
 
Existing literature [12,16,17,33] has shown that 
management response will increase consumer’s 
perceived value, thus 𝜕𝑣𝑗 𝜕𝑅𝑗⁄ > 0 . However, the 
marginal benefit on perceived value by the 
manufacturer’s management response strategy is 
decreasing, 𝜕2𝑣𝑗 𝜕𝑅𝑗
2⁄ < 0.  
We now consider how the manufacturer j adjust its 
management response strategy 𝑅𝑗
∗  according to the 
change of number of its retailers in short run operation.  
The right side of equation (5) is fixed in short run, as all 
the variables are determined by the manufacturer’s 
characteristics. Thus, the left side of equation (5) should 
also keep constant, to achieve the optimal management 
response strategy.  If more retailers join to sell the 
product, 𝑛𝑗  increases. Then the value of 𝜕𝑣𝑗 𝜕𝑅𝑗⁄  
should decrease. Given 𝜕2𝑣𝑗 𝜕𝑅𝑗
2⁄ < 0 , 𝑅𝑗
∗  increases. 
The background intuition is that when the increasing 
number of retailers 𝑛𝑗 adopt the product, per unit benefit 
from management response strategy increases, the 
manufacturer is more likely to invest in management 
response. Therefore, we generate the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: As the number of retailers in the channel 
increases, the manufacturer’s propensity to invest in 
management response. 
As we know, the intra-competition exists as retailers’ 
carry other competing products in the channel, and this 
intra-competition will affect the benefit of 
manufacturer’s management response strategy. End 
consumers are more sensitive to product perceived value 
when the competition is more intensive in the retail 
channels. Thus, 
𝜕
𝜕𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗
(
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗
) > 0.  
Then with the intensification of intra-competition, 
the value of  
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗
̃
 will increase. Back to equation (5), to 
Number of 
retailers
Manufacturers  
management 
response decision
Intra-competition
Retailers rating
Product rating
Variance of 
reviews
H3 H1
H2
H4
H5
H6
H8
H7
H9
＋
＋
－
－
－
＋
＋
－
＋
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maximize the profit, the value of 𝜕𝑣𝑗 𝜕𝑅𝑗⁄  should 
decrease; therefore, R𝑗
∗  will increase. In other words, 
with the increasing intra-competition in the retailer 
channels, the manufacturer should invest in 
management response because management response 
can build brand differentiation and gain their 
competitive advantage among other manufacturers, 
consequently improve profit. Thus, we have the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The more intensive intra-competition in the 
retailer channels, the more likely for the manufacturer 
to invest in management response. 
As we discussed above, management response can 
increase consumer’s perceived value, and a higher 
perceived value can result in higher sales. Therefore, 
manufacturers’ management response is supposed to 
increase retailers’ sales. 
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗
=
𝜕𝑞𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑣𝑗
⋅
𝜕𝑣𝑗
𝜕𝑅𝑗
 > 0 . If 
manufacturer j invests in management response, the 
retailer i’s sales 𝑞𝑖𝑗  will increase, then the inequality (7) 
have a higher probability to hold. Therefore, retailer i 
more likely to adopt manufacturer j’s product, that is, 
𝐷𝑖𝑗  is more likely to be equal 1. As 𝑛𝑗 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑖=1 , the 
number of retailers in the channel will increase. We 
generate the following hypothesis: 
H3: A manufacturer’s management response strategy 
will induce more retailers to adopt the product. 
 
5. Empirical analysis  
 
5.1 Data 
 
We use crawling techniques to track 1439 products 
with customer reviews from 441 brands daily in Wipe 
& Refill category on Amazon.com. We focus on 
studying the repeated-purchase products, such as 
household supplies, because management response is a 
common business practice in household supplies 
categories.  The competition in the Wipe & Refill 
category is intense. Manufacturers have a strong 
incentive to build a good relationship with both end 
consumers and retailers.   
Our data period is from January 2018 to May 2018. 
We collect daily data on product characteristics (product 
rating, sales rank, etc.), channel structure (the number of 
retailers, the number of products a retailer carries, etc.), 
retailers’ characteristics (retailer price, retailer rating, 
the total number of rating, etc.), online reviews, and 
manufacturer’s management response.  The online 
review data includes review posting data, helpfulness 
vote, review rating and review context. Management 
response data includes manufacturers’ responding 
content, responding date and the corresponding review. 
Although there are more than 1400 products in the Wipe 
& Refill categories, only 430 products received new 
reviews during our data period. Totally, 5505 reviews 
and 713 management responses were posted during the 
period.  As most products did not receive new reviews 
every day, we decide to use monthly data for the 
empirical study. 
 
5.2. Empirical model 
 
The theoretical model presented in the previous 
section suggests that the manufacturers’ management 
response decision is a function of the channel structure, 
that is, the number of retailers in the channel, intra-
competition. Meanwhile, the number of retailers in the 
channel is a function of manufacturers’ responding 
decision. We are to examine the reciprocal relationship 
between manufacturers’ management response decision 
and the number of retailers.  We estimate a set of two 
simultaneous equations to describe how the equilibrium 
manufacturers’ management response strategy and the 
number of retailers in the channel are determined. The 
first equation models manufacturers’ strategic 
behaviours and explain the manufacturers’ management 
response decision as an outcome of channel structure 
(including the number of retailers, intra-competition), 
retailers’ credibility level, manufacturers type dummy, 
time dummies and product characteristics such as 
product rating and variance of the customer review 
ratings.  The second equation describes the retailers’ 
adoption behaviours and treats the number of retailers 
as an outcome of manufacturers’ management response 
strategy, product rating, the variance of the customer 
review ratings, sales rank, the intra-competition and 
time dummies. Manufacturers’ management response 
strategy 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  and the number of retailers 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 are the endogenous dependent variables 
in the simultaneous equation model, and other variables 
are exogenous variables. 
The time dummies in both equations control the time 
effect on manufacturers’ management decision and the 
number of retailers in the channel. The descriptive 
statistics of key variables in the model is in Table1. The 
empirical simultaneous equation model is as follows: 
(1)𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑖𝑡 
 
(2)𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2log (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛿3𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿4𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛿5𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿6𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡 + 𝛿7𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡
+ 𝛿8𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑖𝑡 
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6. Estimation and result  
 
6.1 Estimation  
 
The simultaneous equations model contains an 
endogenous dichotomous variable (management 
response decision) and an endogenous continuous 
variable (number of retailers in the channel). The two 
equations have exclusion restrictions for identification. 
The manufacturers’ management response investment 
decision equation has two variables excluded in the 
channel structure equation— the average rating of 
retailers 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 and manufacturer type 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖. These two variables influence manufacturers’ 
management response investment decision by affecting 
manufacturers’ investment, but without any direct 
impact on the number of retailers in the channel.  
Similarly, the channel structure equation is identified by 
a variable excluded in the manufacturers’ management 
response investment equation—the sales rank of the 
product log (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡) . The benefit of the simultaneous 
method is that it captures causality between the two 
dependent variables. Because there are both 
dichotomous and continuous endogenous dependent 
variables in the model, traditional two-stage or three-
stage least squares estimation which is suitable for both 
continuous endogenous dependent variables equations 
will lead to biased estimates. Therefore, we use the two-
stage probit least squares estimation method [18], which 
correct the biased standard errors in the second stage of 
the estimation. The steps of the estimation approach are 
as following: (1) In step 1, the endogenous variables are 
fitted using all the exogenous variables. The 
dichotomous endogenous variable (management 
response decision) is estimated via Probit and the 
continuous endogenous variable (the number of retailers 
in the channel) is estimated via OLS. (2) In step 2, we 
regress management response decision and number of 
retailers on the include exogenous variables and 
predicted values of endogenous variables from step 1. 
(3) In the final step, the outputted standard errors for 
each model in the second step are corrected using 
variance-covariance matrices.  
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Key Model Variables 
 Explanation M SD Min Max 
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒖𝒎𝒊𝒕 The average number retailers of the product i at time t  6.75 6.05 1 28.7 
𝒓𝒆𝒑𝒍𝒚𝒊𝒕 The possibility for manufacturer of the product i to respond 
to customer reviews at time t 
0.11 0.32 1 0 
𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒂_𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 The average of the number of other products the product i 
retailers carries (within the category) at time t 
37.12 41.54 0 193.7 
𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒅𝒖𝒄𝒕_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 The average review rating of the product i at time t 3.93 0.72 0 5 
𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 The variance of the review rating of the product i 1.95 1.53 0 5 
𝒓𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊𝒍𝒆𝒓_𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 The weighted average of retailer rating of product i at time t  4.87 0.18 4 5 
𝐥𝐨𝐠 (𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒊𝒕) Log transformation of the average sales rank of the product 
i at time t 
4.77 1.30 0 8.17 
 
6.2 Result 
 
 Table 2 presents the full estimates of the 
simultaneous equations model. We first look at the 
factors that determine manufacturers’ management 
response investment decision. We find that the 
coefficient of the number of retailers (𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 ) in 
the channel is significantly positive, supporting 
hypothesis H1. The result indicates that the number of 
retailers in the channel is positively related to the 
propensity of manufacturers to invest in management 
response. We find that the coefficient of 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡  in Equation 1 is positive and 
significant. This result support H2, that more intense the 
intra-competition in the retailer channels is, the more 
likely for the manufacturer to invest in responding 
customer reviews. These results provide an empirical 
evidence for our theoretical finding that a 
manufacturer’s management response strategy depends 
on the structure of the distribution channel, including the 
number of retailers in the channel and intra-competition. 
Moreover, the coefficient of retailers’ ratings 
( 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 ), is negative and significant, 
suggesting that when the average level of retailers’ 
credibility is high,  manufacturers are less likely to 
invest in management response.  
Next, we analyze the factors affect the number of 
retailers in the channel. The coefficient of 
manufacturers’ management response decision (𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡) 
is positive and significant in Equation 2. This result is 
consistent with H3, which support our theoretical 
finding that manufacturers’ management response 
strategies have a positive impact on retailers’ decision 
to adopt the manufacturers’ products. As the 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a 
dummy variable in Equation 2, the result indicates that 
if a manufacturer invests in responding customer 
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reviews, more retailers are willing to carry its product, 
and else otherwise. The coefficient for the control 
variable, the sales rank of the product ( log (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡)), 
which reflect the demand of the product and directly 
influence retailers’ adoption decision, is negative and 
significant. This result indicates manufacturer’s product 
with top rank attracts more retailers to adopt the product. 
Moreover, the effect of  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 on the 
number of retailers is negative and significant, 
suggesting that retailers are willing to carry product with 
less intensive competition. 
In both equations, the time dummies are 
insignificant, suggesting that main effects not changed 
over time.  
Table 2 estimation results 
 Model 1(Base Model) 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 Coef. Std. 
Err. 
P>t 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 0.245*** 0.044 0.000  
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 -1.363** 0.497 0.006  
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 0.009** 0.003 0.004  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖 0.468 0.308 0.128  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 -0.115 0.175 0.511  
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 0.167 0.104 0.108  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡 0.129 0.235 0.582  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡 0.234 0.238 0.325  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 -0.170 0.382 0.657  
intercept 2.726 2.413 0.259 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡    
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 2.211*** 0.396 0.000  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 0.438 0.437 0.316  
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.397 0.286 0.165  
log (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡) -0.944** 0.279 0.001  
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 -0.047*** 0.007 0.000  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡 -0.473 0.658 0.472  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡 -0.904 0.658 0.170  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 -0.071 1.049 0.946  
intercept 16.323*** 2.473 0.000  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
7. Robustness check 
 
7.1 Using alternative estimation method 
 
In the main model, we use the two-stage probit least 
squares method [18] to estimate the simultaneous 
equations model. We now check the robustness of our 
findings using an alternative estimation method. We try 
to estimate the two equations in the simultaneous system 
separately. To estimate the Equation 1, we use the two-
stage estimator method described in Newey (1987), 
which is suitable for probit model with a continuous 
endogenous variable [22]. In Equation 1, the variable 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 is a continuous endogenous variable, and 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  is dummy dependent variable. The variable 
log (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡), which is in Equation 2 but not in Equation 
1, is used as the instrument variable. To estimate 
Equation 2, we use the estimate method according to 
Wooldridge (2010) [34]. In the first step, we regress the 
endogenous variable on all the exogenous instruments 
via Probit, and then use the predicted value in first step 
as the IV in the 2SLS model. In Equation 2, the variable 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  is dummy endogenous variable and 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡  is continuous dependent variable. Our 
analysis using such estimation methods yields similar 
results. However, because the simultaneous interaction 
between 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 is not considered in 
such methods, the coefficient of 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 which directly 
reflect the impact on 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡, is greater than the 
coefficient in base model. The results present in Table3. 
Table 3 Robustness checks 
 Model 2 
(Alternative 
estimation 
method) 
Model 3 
(product features 
as control 
variables) 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 Coef. Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err. 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 0.244*** 0.045 0.270*** 0.047 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 -1.390** 0.513 -1.368** 0.533 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 0.010** 0.003 0.010** 0.003 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑖 0.467 0.315 0.412 0.312 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 -0.119 0.178 -0.111 0.185 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 0.166 0.106 0.191 0.109 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡 0.122 0.241 0.158 0.245 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡 0.237 0.243 0.282 0.248 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 -0.162 0.390 -0.245 0.398 
Unscented𝑖   0.387 0.258 
Natural𝑖   -0.433 0.236 
AlcoholFree𝑖   0.422 0.318 
HypoAllergenic𝑖   -0.391 0.324 
Sensitive𝑖   -0.214 0.285 
intercept 2.874 2.492 2.549 2.569 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 12.911*** 1.709 2.341*** 0.373 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 0.668* 0.336 0.467 0.465 
𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.168 0.234 -0.474 0.296 
log (𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡) -0.100*** 0.253 -0.797** 0.274 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 -0.045*** 0.006 -0.046*** 0.007 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒2𝑡 -0.210 0.615 -0.474 0.677 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒3𝑡 -0.777 0.616 -0.939 0.676 
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒4𝑡 -0.573 0.923 0.183 1.086 
intercept 9.810*** 2.349 15.969*** 2.610 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
7.2 Using product features as control variables 
 
We report results with the controls for the product 
features in Table3. Some specific features of the product 
may influence manufacturers’ management response 
investment decision. Therefore, we try to use some 
product features as control variables to check whether 
manufacturers are more likely to respond to products 
with some specific features. The robustness check relies 
on the primary product features classified by 
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Amazon.com, including Unscented, Natural, Alcohol-
Free, Hypo-Allergenic, Sensitive. We take these five 
features as dummy control variables to repeat our 
estimation. The results show that coefficients of these 
five dummies are insignificant, which indicates 
manufacturers will not tend to make a management 
response investment decision on a product with specific 
features. 
 
8. Discussion and conclusion  
 
In this paper, we present a theoretical model to 
analyze how are manufacturers’ management response 
strategies affected by the features of the channel 
structure and how do manufacturers' management 
response strategies restructure the distribution channel? 
And we empirically test the hypotheses developed based 
on the theoretical model. 
Our results show that channel structure affects 
manufacturers’ management response investment 
decision. Firstly, As the marginal cost of management 
response is constant, the more retailer channels a 
manufacturer is using, the more benefit the 
manufacturer’s management response strategy will 
generate. Therefore, the manufacturer is more likely to 
invest in responding to customer reviews. Secondly, the 
direct impact of intra-competition on manufacturers’ 
management response decisions is significantly positive, 
showing that the marginal benefit of a manufacturer’s 
management response strategy is high when its products 
competes intensively with competitors in the retailer 
channels. Besides, the average retailers’ rating has 
significantly negative impact on manufacturers’ 
management response investment decision. The high 
rating of retailers is a guarantee of the quality of goods 
and services, and the marginal benefit of manufacturers’ 
management response strategies is low when the rating 
of retailers is high. Therefore, manufacturers have lower 
propensity to respond to the product. Finally, our results 
also show that manufacturers’ management response 
strategies can attract more retailers to carry the product 
and alter the channel structure, as the manufacturer’s 
management response strategy can promote the sale of 
retailers who carry its product. 
Our empirical study also shows some other findings 
regarding the control variables. The sales rank of the 
product has a significantly negative influence on the 
number of retailers. The top sales rank stands for the 
high quality of product to some extent and is a guarantee 
for the high consumer demand, thus retailers are likely 
to adopt the product. Moreover, the intra-competition in 
the channel has a negative and significant impact on 
retailers’ adoption decision as well. When the intra-
competition is more intensive, the profit for retailers 
who adopts the manufacturer’s product will decrease, 
thus less retailers will adopt the product. 
This research contributes to the literature in several 
ways. First, we examine the effect of channel structure 
on manufacturers’ marketing strategies of directly 
communicating with end consumers. Prior research 
focuses on the effect of manufacturers’ marketing 
strategies direct to consumers on manufacturer 
themselves and retailers in the channel [8,26].  Although 
a few researchers have examined the effect of channel 
structure characteristics on manufacturers’ marketing 
strategy [6,23,40], these researchers ignored its 
reciprocal relationship with channel structure. Our 
results demonstrate that manufacturers’ marketing 
strategy of management response interacts with channel 
structure. Second, we extend existing research on the 
importance of directly communicating with end 
consumers on firms’ performance. Prior research has 
examined the importance of management response on 
product sales [37] and consumer satisfaction [12,17,19]. 
We extend this research by illustrating the importance 
of management response strategy on channel 
relationship management. 
Our study provides managerial implications. The 
empirical findings suggest that when there are many 
retailers in a distribution channel, and there is intense 
competition among the products carried by the retailers, 
the manufacturer should invest in marketing strategies 
direct to end consumers. Moreover, retailers can take 
advantage of the manufacturers’ strategies direct to end 
consumers when they make their product adoption 
decision because products which manufacturers invest 
in marketing strategies are supposed to have higher 
perceived quality. 
This study has limitations that further research could 
address. First, we examined the manufacturers’ 
management response decision on repeated-purchased 
products on Amazon.com. The manufacturers’ 
management response behaviour of other types of 
product is rare on Amazon.com.  If the data are available, 
we can compare manufacturers investment decision on 
management response in different product types. 
Secondly, we focus on manufacturers’ management 
response decision. We do not analyze the characteristics 
of management response, such as the length of the 
management response content, and the corresponding 
reviews valence. Such analysis would offer a deeper 
understanding of manufacturers’ responding strategies. 
Finally, we assume that the marginal costs for 
manufacturers are fixed. However, this could affect 
manufactures' strategy to respond to customer reviews. 
We will relax the assumption in the future study. 
In conclusion, our study validates the interactive 
impacts between firms’ direct communication strategies 
and channel structure. Specifically, it explores the 
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complex impacts of the channel structure on 
manufacturers’ management response to online reviews 
in a multi-channel distribution system. It offers 
manufactures guidelines for investment in marketing 
strategies direct to end consumers under different 
channel structure. It also gives insight into the further 
research about direct marketing strategies and channel 
relationship management. 
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